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held the repair of the Y connector, the repair of the sewage lines, and
the removal of the manure pit prior to March 10, 1999, made the
possibility of an ongoing violation on the filing date of the suit too
Therefore, the court held that the
remote and speculative.
Woodwards did not meet the required burden of establishing a prima
facie CWA claim.
Subsequently, the court granted Defendants' summary judgment
motion pertaining to the federal CWA claims. In addition, the court
discretionally decided not to grant supplemental jurisdiction to the
Woodwards' state law property and tort claims because all of the
Woodwards' federal based claims were dismissed.
Kirk Waible
Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Colo. 2000)
(denying environmental organization's claims for relief on five
grounds concerning Montana state regulations).
Plaintiffs, several environmental organizations (collectively
"American Wildlands"), requested injunctive and declaratory relief.
The defendants were various administrators in the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"). American Wildlands identified five
grounds for relief. All grounds for relief pertained to Montana
standards and involved claims that EPA engaged in arbitrary and
capricious decision-making, abused its discretion, or violated the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") or the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").
From 1989 to 1998, Montana promulgated several revisions to its
water quality standards. In March 1998, American Wildlands filed a
notice of violation pursuant to the CWA, which alleged EPA had failed
In December 1998,
to review Montana's proposed standards.
American Wildlands sent a letter to EPA urging them to disapprove
Montana's proposed standards since Montana had not clarified issues
about which EPA had inquired. In December 1998 and January 1999,
EPA reviewed some of Montana's proposed standards. Accordingly,
American Wildlands amended its complaint to address five issues.
The court noted that in order to comply with the CWA a state must
promulgate standards for non-point and point-source pollution
control. If a state wants to revise or adopt a new standard, the state
must seek EPA approval. If EPA determines the standard meets CWA
requirements, then the standard becomes applicable to the state's
waters.
First, American Wildlands asserted EPA acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, abused its discretion, or violated the CWA when it
approved Montana's standard exempting non-point source pollution
from state antidegradation rules. EPA may only approve state
Further, EPA's
standards that are consistent with the CWA.
regulations require state standards to include antidegradation policies
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that ensure water quality necessary to protect existing uses. The CWA
splits antidegradation policies into three tiers. These tiers generally
require that states may not allow water quality to degrade. The court
recognized that Montana's new policy exempted non-point source
pollution from this antidegradation review when reasonable
conservation practices were used and beneficial uses were protected.
American Wildlands contended Montana's new policy undermined the
CWA's antidegradation tiers. EPA maintained that it did not have the
authority to require states to implement non-point source regulation
programs since the CWA did not specifically address antidegradation
in the context of non-point source pollution. For this reason, and
because EPA complied with mandatory CWA guidelines and
procedures, the court found EPA had not acted arbitrarily or
capriciously.
Second, American Wildlands argued EPA's conduct was arbitrary,
capricious, or in violation of the CWA when it approved Montana's
standard exempting mixing zones from state antidegradation rules
and narrative water quality criteria. Montana law provided that mixing
zones be as small as possible, have minimum effects on water uses, and
have definable boundaries. American Wildlands contended these
provisions did not place necessary restrictions on the creation of
mixing zones, did not create narrative or numeric criteria with which
to protect uses, and did not comply with state antidegradation rules.
EPA responded that the policy did provide several restrictions,
including prohibiting lethality and ensuring that drinking water was
not affected. According to the CWA, although EPA may suggest
mixing zone management techniques, states are free to develop
alternate protections. Since Montana had promulgated regulations
providing water quality criteria for mixing zones, EPA's approval was
permissible. The court then found the CWA did not require narrative
and numeric criteria, but only recommended them. Finally, since
mixing zones comprised a small portion of a water body and
antidegradation criteria applied to a water body as a whole, the court
concluded Montana's policy did not violate state criteria. The court
found that EPA had examined all relevant facts and that a rational
connection between those facts and the decision to approve existed.
Third, American Wildlands asserted that when EPA disapproved
some of Montana's standards it should have promulgated replacement
standards. However, the court noted the CWA provided an exception
to this rule, whereby if a state adopts satisfactory standards within
ninety days, EPA does not have to promulgate replacement
regulations. Although at the time of trial Montana had not adopted
replacement regulations, the court found that because Montana had
successfully amended several other provisions, EPA acted within its
authority when it relied on Montana's intentions to address the issue
in a timely manner.
Fourth, American Wildlands stated EPA acted arbitrarily and

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 4

capriciously, abused its discretion, and violated the CWA and the APA
when it failed to review Montana's definition of "interested person."
Under the CWA's "general policies," EPA must review and approve
discretionary state policies. The court found EPA's decision not to
review the definition acceptable since the CWA neither requires that a
state define "interested person," nor requires a state to review
procedural policies.
Finally, American Wildlands asserted EPA incorporated and used
Montana standards both prior to EPA approval and after disapproval.
American Wildlands claimed this action was arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, and violated the CWA and the APA. Accordingly,
American Wildlands asked the court for injunctive relief concerning
the issue. EPA countered that since the time American Wildlands
brought the action it had approved almost all of the disapproved
standards at issue, so the claim was moot and the court lacked
jurisdiction. The court agreed with EPA, finding the issue moot for
two reasons. First, the circuit court of appeals could review a decision
to issue or deny a permit under the CWA. And second, EPA had since
approved most of the standards at issue.
The court denied all relief sought by American Wildlands and
dismissed the action with prejudice.
Rebekah King
Am. Mining Cong. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 120 F. Supp.
2d (D. D.C. 2000) (prohibiting the Army Corps of Engineers from
requiring a permit for incidental fallback).
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") authorizes the Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to issue permits for the discharge of
dredged material into navigable waters. The CWA defines "discharge"
as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source," and the definition of "pollutants" includes "dredged spoil."
In 1986, the Corps issued a definition of "dredged material" that
excluded "incidental soil movements occurring during normal
dredging operations." In 1993, a lawsuit resulted in the "Tulloch
Rule," which removed the 1986 exception and expanded the
definition of "dredged material" to include redeposit. Redeposit
includes incidental fallback, or dredged material that spills out of the
container used to remove it and falls back into the water from which it
was taken. In 1997, the National Association of Home Builders
challenged the Tulloch Rule on the basis that incidental fallback does
not constitute an addition under the definition of discharge. The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia agreed and
enjoined agencies from applying or enforcing it. In 1998, the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. The agencies
promulgated an interim rule ("May 10th rule") removing reference to

